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Abstract
To determine the function or confirmation and discon:firmation of expectancy during modeling behavior, 60 primary

school children were exposed to a training film (adult male
model), and then to three conditions or expectancy confirmation (group C,

l~;

group CNe, 50%; group NC, 0%) through a

second experimental £ilm.

Sst

responses were observed under

incentive and no-incentive conditions.
not significant, incentive was (p

<

Though expectancy was

~Ol).

S responses which

matched M's responses in the film showed that cOnXirmation
expectancy did not a£fect imitative l.earning.

ox

While the

perceptual definition of expectancy in this study had no
e£fect, expectancy as a motivational condition and measured
during actual observational l.earning (training rilm) was
discussed as having an effect on number o£ matching responses
in modeling.
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Chapter I

Introduction
Introduction

~~

Problem

The innovative modeling/vicarious learning experiments

ox

Albert Bandura (1962, 1965b, 1969) are distinct among

contemporary psychological research :for their support of a
stimulus-contiguity theory of observational learning.
Whereas reinforcement theory (Miller and Dollard, 1941) and
sensory feedback theory (Mowrer, 1960) have been put :forth
to explain what is variously called imitation or social
learning, these theories have not been as extensively
researched in their application to modeling as has Bandura' s
theory.
Modeling is the observational learning o£ matching
responses when the observer does not perform the model's
responses during the process of acquisition and no

rein£orce~

ment is given to the model or the observer (Bandura, 1968)0
In an experiment in which children observed a film-mediated
model exhibit a sequence of physical and verbal aggressive
responses, Bandura (l965a) has shown that the acquisition of
matching responses by the observer results primarily from
stimUlus contiguity and associated symbolic processes.
1

In

2

one treatment condition the model was severely punished
Iollowing the display or aggressive behavior; in a second the
model was rewarded with treats and praise; and in the third
the model's responses had no consequences.

A performance

test after the film revealed that the reinforcement contingencies applied to the model's responses resulted in

differential degrees of matching behavior.
model-rewarded and

Do~onsequ.ences

Those in the

groups performed a signifi-

cantly greater variety of matching responses than those in
the model-punished group.

Following the performance test,

incentive conditions were introduced to all three 9roups for
a second performance.

Matching responses in all groups

increased and the performance differences of the first test
were eliminated, revealing equal amounts of learning in the
model.-punished, model-rewarded, and

no~consequences

groups.

Phillips (1968) supports Bandura in his finding that a
subject who merely observes a nonreinrorced model displays a
significant increase in critical responses.

In a replication

of two verbal conditioning experiments in which Ss said words
in turn with a tape-recorded voice, Phillips added a control
group, which, unlike the experimental groups (one 30J5
vicarious reinforcement, one 601£ vicarious reinforcement),
did not hear the direct verbal reinrorcement

ox

E nor the

3

vicarious reinforcement on tape.

The conclusion was that the

apparent learning due to vicarious reinIorcement was in fact
solely the result of imitation of the model.

Thus, reinforce-

ment consequences to the model or to the observer influence

only the performance ox responses, not the learning of
responses.

Another study (Bandura and McDonald, 1963) tested the
effects or modeling v. reini'orcement in altering children's
moral judgment responses.

Children exhibiting subjective

judgments were either (a) exposed to models who expressed
objective judgments or (b) reinrorced for objective judgments.
Judgmental responses were more effectively altered by the

model-exposed group than the merely-reinrorced group.
From a Guthrian-contiguity point of view, reinforcement
may be said to preserve an S-R sequence, that is, prevent
unlearning.

If this is the case, how is the observed S-R

response sequence of the model preserved in the observer wdthout reinforcement, as Bandura maintains?

8andura (1965a,

P. 590) theorizes that:

when an Observer witnesses a model exhibit a sequence
of responses the observer acquires, through contiguous
association or sensory events, perceptual and symbolic
responses possessing cue properties that are capable
of eliciting, at some time after a demonstration,
overt responses corresponding to those that have been
modeled.

4

Bandura's research on this mediational/contiguity theory,

even when considering attentional and motivational processes,
has not provided, prior to observer per£ormance t a measurable

terminating point at which the experimenter can say learning
has taken place.

Perhaps it is not what comes after the response that is
crucial (as in reinforcement theory), but what comes before.

This which "comes before" is proposed to · be a m.ediationalcognitive process of expectation t which occurs in a modeling
situation before the observer makes

~y

overt responses.

As

a cogni tive process, expectation has an on-.going nature,
which is its quality of preserving an S-R sequence.

At the

same time, as a mediational process , it has an overt
measurable nature in the verbal reports of the observer
(experimental subject).
Review

.2!. Literature

Because of its cognitive nature, Bandura's theory is
not necessarily antagonistic to an expectancy construct.

A

large block o£ Bandura's work is concerned with the thera-

peutic use of modeling in modi£ying anxiety disorders.

The

first study in' a series on what Bandura terms "vicarious
extinction f ' dealt wi th reducing dog avoidance behavior in
children (Bandura, Grusec, and Menlove, 1967).

The £our

5

treatment conditions were:

model in positive context; model

in neutral context; dog in positive context; and positive
context only.

The' children in the model groups observed a

peer model exhibit progressively more fear-provoking behavior
with the dog from session to session.

or

The post-test measure

dog-avoidance behavior (after completion of the treatment

and again a month later) revealed that the two model groups

showed significantly greater approach behavior both toward
the experimental and an unfamiliar animal (modeling effects
had generalized) than did children in the dog and control

groups.
In later experiments, Bandu.ra tested the ef'f'ects o£

single model v. multiple models (Bandera and Manlove, 1968)
and :found little dif£erencej compared live modeling with

participation to symbolic modeling and to desensitization
(Bandura, 1969) and found live modeling most e£fective, and
symbolic modeling m.ore ef':fective than desensitization; and
compared symbolic modeling wi th relaxation to symbolic
modeling without relaxation (Bandura, 1969) and :found little
difference.
This research is relevant for its support of a cognitive

theory of learning, that is, one involving "symbolic coding
and central organization of modeling stimuli, their

6

representation in memory, in verbal and imaginal codes, and
their subsequent transformation f'rom symbolic forms to motor
p~

equivalents" (Bandura, 1969,

127).

It seems feasible to

theorize that the basis for either f'orming symbols or
transforming these symbols (verbal and imaginal) into
performance is expectancy.
and performance

or

Bandu~ ra

says

If

_

••

selection

matching responses is mainly governed by

anticipated outcomes based on previous consequences that were
directly encountered, vicariously experienced, or selfadministered" (1969, po 132)0
Expectancy may be a motivational construct tied to
modeling stimuli.

As such, it is not easy to test its effect,

unless its confirmation or disconfirmation during the observational process of modeling can be shown to affect subsequent
performance under incentive (learning

measure)~

Expectation as part of cognitive theory has been
non-aligned with most S-R learning theories.

It is appro-

priate to consider the relationship of this cognitive concept
to the learning concept of modeling.

A primary connection

theoretically between expectation and modeling is the
dependence of both on sequential and/or meaningful sensory
feedbacko

Feedback is a necessary but not adequate element

of observational learning.

Depending upon what his expec-

tations are, an observer in a modeling situation must be

7

continually recomposing what Bandura (1969) terms his
tlimagina1/verbal representational system. u

Such cognitive

symbolization iacili tates modeling or f:fvicarious learningtf
as Bandura (196Sb) has shown in a study in which children
observe a film-mediated model exhibit a sequence of novel
responses under three conditions:

Iacilitative symbolization

(5s verbalized the modeling stimuli); passive observation
(55 simp ly observed the film); or competing symbolization

(5s counted rapidly while observing the film).

Incentive/set

children were told that Iollowing' the movie they would be
asked to reproduce the model's responses and given candy if
correct; no-incentive/set children were just told they would
return to their school room.

All 55 counted out loud between

the end of the movie and reproduction so their activity would
be held constant.

All 5s were offered candy reinIorcement

and social rewards for matching responses correctly performed.
The results showed that the facilitative group performed
significantly more matching responses than the passive and the
passive more than the competing group.
influence on observational learning.

Incen tive set had no
Verbal sywbolization

thus seems to have a "stamping in" effect.
Representational mediators acquired in modeling through
contigui ty learning are based on continual feedback, hence,

8

are sequentially associated.

The very r'contiguoQsness, n or

patterning of an 5-R sequence con:firms an expectation, since
the logicalness, the going-to-fruition o:f expectation is not

novel to the observer but is part o:f his behavioral, albeit
cognitive repertoire

ox

responseso

The model's response is

the cue that the observed situation is over (in the cognitive
world or any individu.al subject).

This response is the cU.e

:for conxirmation or discanfixmatioD of what the observer was
expecting.

The covert, self-reinforcing quali1:y of expec-

tancy confirmation or disconxirmation through sensory feedback preserves the S-R sequence.

With the expectancy

confirmed or disconfirmed, that is, now that the individual
as an observer is cognitively out of the situation, he does
not need overt or even vicarious reinforcement (to the model)
in order to learn, though, as Bandura (1969) revealed, he
may need incentive to increase his per:formance of the model's
responses (i.e., to show the tllearningff that has taken
place) •
According to this theory, i n a proposed experimental
groupiRg in which expectancies are confirmed (C), or not
confirmed (NC), there would be no difference between groups
since both confirmation and disconfirmation serve to take the
individual out of the S,.R situation and prevent unlearning.

9

The introduction into this design of a third group in which
expectancies are alternately confirmed and not confirmed (CNC)
adds a dimension similar to McDavid's (1964) paradigm of

typical processes outside the laboratory.

This third

expectancy condition may serve to distinguish interaction
between confirmation and disconfirmation.
The issue revolves around whether or not there is a
behavioral difference between a confirmed and disconfirmed
expectancy, that is, in terms of a learning eff'ect.
take the Case for confirmed expectancy first.

Let us

Suppose an

observer watches a model in a film make responses, and at
various times in the fila aakes six predictions based on what
he is expecting the model to do next.

One may question:

does

the observer have six different expectations or an overall

expectation (film length)?
According to the orderliness/logicalness principle of
stimulus sequence stated earlier, one might be tempted to
predict that those in group C, in which expectancies are
always confirmed, that is, the orderly thing happens, will
show more matching responses than those in group

Ne, in which

expectations are always disconfirmed, that is, the disorderly,
illogical thing happens.

Or, con£irmation of expectancy,

like verbal symbolization, may have a facilitory, "stamping

10
inn effect on the learning of observed responses, whereas,

disconfirmation may have a competing effect.
However, one might more readily predict that the NC
group will perform more matching responses than the C groupo
Crandall (1967) reported that ratings of stimuli with high

confirmation value never differed significantly from ratings
of unfamiliar stimuli.

His theory that expectancy enhances

stimulus preference seems to be in accord with Singer's
(1968) consistency theory that an individual seeks consis-

tency on the basis of selective stimulus processing, or
scbemata that help the person to screen and hypothesize about
a stimulus array.

The crucial point o£ Crandall's research

for the confirmation v. disconfirmation issue is his £inding
that arousal (predictive) stimuli were preferred over

confirmation stimuli.

Conrirmation seems to end an S-R

sequence less fixedly than disconfirmation because the person
whose expectation is discon£irmed has more adjustment to
make.

Considering this gxeater adjustment, activation theory

would also predict a higher probability of matching responses
in the high dissonance or NC group (Peak, 1968).
This expectancy disconIirmation, or cognitive dissonance

as Festinger (1957) has termed it, may also have stronger
motivational properties than the confirmation condition.

11

Cognitive dissonance has been described by Aronson (1968,
p. 5) as a Unegative drive state which occurs whenever an

individual simul taneou.sly holds two cogni tions (ideas,
beliefs, opinions) which are psychologically inconsistent."
Disconfirmation of expectancy does not seem to raIl into
the modeling/variable categories of model attributes, stimuli
characteristics, or subject characteristics, but rather into
the category OI motivation, and thus may operate to:

(a) in-

crease desire to perform the model's responses, that is lfgo
along with U the unexpected responsej or (b) alter the
perceptual threshhold, so that the observed act is ''put out
of mind,n since i t is inconsistent with the held expectation.
Whereas dissonance seems to have a negative eirect, a
discOllfirmation ox expectancy can be conceived of as a
negative stimulus.

Senf and Miller (1967), in applying the

Pavlovian principle of positive induction to discriminatory
learning, theorize that a negative stimulus

(~S)

has an

inductive effect of strengthening the excitability of :focus
of a positive stimulus (+S) on the cortex.

It is harder to

extinguish a response to a +S by nonrein.forced trials if the
presentation of +S is alternated with -5 than if there is
only a succession of +S.

The

~S

has an excitatory effect,

increasing resistance to extinction of nonreinforced +S,

12
rather than an inhibitory effect, as the

Hull~Spence

theorist would say.
This principle of positive induction relates to expectancy and the measure of it (by stopping a film and asking
expectations) in this way:

the presence of a -5 (expectation

discon£irmed) alternately with nonrein:forced +S (expectation
confirmed) may increase the learning of the +5 0

The absence

of -5 with only a succession of +S would theoretically have
less "focusing, 11 hence, less learning facili tation.

On this

basis, one can hypothesize that an experimental group in which
expectancy is alternately con£irmed and disconfirmed (CNC)
would produce a higher number of matching responses than a
group in which al l expectations would be confirmed (C).
MCDavid (1964), however, gives little credence to this
hypothesis in his study on ambiguity of cues in learning

color discrimination.

In this imitation experiment, the

conditions

or

ficantly.

Under the condition

training affected levels

ox

or

performance signi-

lOOJb consistency in color/

cue association, there was the most imitation.

The condition

of 67% partial-hut-incomplete association produced the least
imitation, less than the 33% random association.

the

l~

Considering

condition as analogous to the C group (+S) and the

67% condition as analogous to the NC group (-5), this study

13

supports the hypothesis that C would have signifcantly more
matching responses than NC.
The problem

ox

the role of expectancy in modeling

behavior should deal with expectancy as a m.ediational construct in a way di:ff'erent from Bandu,r a' s concept of sti:m.ulus
contiguity.

That is, expectancy will be thought

or

as the

cognitive process between the antecedent conditions of the
model's behavior in the film prior to the point at which the
experimenter asks the subject his expectation
no-consequence

condi~ion

~

the

or the model's responses.

Assuming expectancy to be a mediator, Bandura would

probably ask:

Does expectancy have to do with response

acquisition or response selection?

or,

does expectancy have

to do with learning itself or only with performance and information processi.n g?

According to Bandura ' s experimental" design

in the model-consequences study (1965a), if expectancy is a
factor in observational learning, then any group dif:ferences
(confirmation v. discomrirmation) in the first trial will not
be wiped out by incentive in a second trial.

This experiment

was set up to test only the conditions of expectancy.

A no-

difference result between groups would not confirm expectancy's
function in stimulus/contiguity learning.

It may be that

14

expectancy will only affect acceptance of information
(Flanders, 1968).
Indeed, one may not be able practically to separate
expectancy and stimulus/contiguity £or differences of effect
on learning, although Reynolds (1967) in a paired-associate
learning experiment found that contigu.ous presentation of

items is as effective as conrirmation of anticipation.

The

anticipation items consisted of a stimulus followed by an S-R
pair as confirmation

(S--~-S-R).

The contiguity items were

simply the S-R pair followed by a pause.

Reynold's separation

of anticipation (expectation) and contiguity may onJy be an
operational one and only for a simp1e association task, but

its simple, perceptual basis is not incongruent with Bandura's
theory (see page 3).
Statement

£!

HYpotheses

There is theory and evidence to sbow that disconfirmatiOD of expectancy will produce more learning through greater
motivational effects which increase the desire to perform the
model's responses; through exfects of contrast and positive
induction; or through erfects of arousal.
There is also theory and evidence to show that confirmation of expectancy will produce more learning through a
-£ acili tatory,

I!

stamping in" effect; through self -rein£orcing

15

sensory feedback; through motivational effects altering
threshold perception; and through promotion of response
extinction.

In discussing Tolman's principle of confirmation,

Hilgard and Bower (1966) point out that if an expectancy is
not confirmed, its probability value is decreased, that is,
it undergoes extinction.

If this is true, then the NC group

should be less likely to produce those responses predicted but
not confirmed, or, in other words, group C shou,ld match more
responses of the film model than NC.

There is also evidence

to the contrary, such as Lester's study (l967) which indicated
that the disconfirmation of expectancy has no significant
effect on resistance to extinction for children whose task was
to guess whether or not candy was in a box_

Instead, the

child was in.fluenced by his own expectation of reward rather
than rewards received or number of discon£irmations.

In

other words, resistance to extinction of a response (a certain
guess) was greater if based on expected rather than actual
reward pattern (such as N, N, R).
In view

ox

the lack of research directly relating to

expectancy/modeling, it is feasible to make several hypotheses, all of which are consonant in attempting to relegate
cognitive~expectancy

theory to

learning~modeling

theory.

16

A statement

or

six hypotheses will serve to summarize

the divergent research and theory reviewed:
contiguity:

(a) stimulus

if there are differences between groups, incen-

tive conditions will erase such differences, indicating that
expectancy is not a functional part of the learning process
in modeling;

(b) contrast, focus:

The partial disconfirma-

tion group (CNC) will perform more matching responses than
group

C (+S) or group Ne (-S), based on the principle of

positive induction; (c) cognitive dissonance:

NC group will

perform more matching responses on the basis of stronger
motivation through arousal and activation of negative drive;
(d) sequence/orderliness; group C will learn more matching

responses on the basis of positive
sensory feedback;

self~reinforcement

(e) response extinction:

produce more matching responses since

Ne

through

group C will

responses are

supposed to extinguish on the basis that disconfirmed
expectancies decrease in probability value; and (f) facilitory:
confirmation of expectancy in group C f1stampS in'l model's
responses, whereas ambiguity of cues in CNC group has an
interference effect.
The pur.pose

ox

this study is to determdne the effect

that expectancy conditions of confirmation and discon£irma.
tion have during the observational process in modeling

17
behavior.

The "wide open stance tl taken with the use of

several hypotheses is not a xeeble attempt to be able to
"prove anythingtr but rather is an effort to break some new
joint paths of study in two interesting areas of psychology,
the cognitive and the behavioral, whose rapprochement is

overdue.

Chapter II

Method

Subjects
Subjects (Ss) were 60 primary school children, 30 from
each o£ two public elementary schools in Pittsburg, Kansas.
Age range was from 4.3 to 6.5 years wi th a mean age of 70

months.
Each experimental group contained 20 5s, 10 males and
10 females, assigned in a random order to a predetermined
grouping sequence of fifteen (fifteen males, :fifteen females

for each school) thusly:

C, NC, CNC; Ne, eNe, C.

C, NC, eNC; CNC, Ne, C; NC t C, eNC;

Incentive order, i.e., whether the

incentive phase was first or the no-incentive phase was first,

was randomly assigned to this groupillg sequence.

Boys in one

kindergarten population were selected and ordered in the
grouping sequence by drawing numbers from a hat:

the boy

getting number one would be assigned to group C and the
corresponding incentive phase, the second boy to group NC, and
so forth until all boys had been ordered.
selected and ordered the salIle way.

The girls were

Of the 15 boys so ordered

and assigned at one school, boys number (1), (6), and (10)

18
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might be in group C; however, boy number (1) might be the

first subject tested, boy number (6) the tenth subject tested,
and boy number (10) the nineteenth boy tested, because boys
and girls were tested in the same session, alternately.

Treatment
There were two experimental variables:
incentive.

expectancy and

Expectancy was a prediction of what the S

thou.ght would happen next in the film.
expectancy occurred when

SIS

Confirmation of

prediction happened in the

film; discon£irmation of expectancy occurred when S's prediction did not happen in the film.

The nature of the three

groups was determined by expectancy conditions:

in group C

at all six choice points, the film-mediated model ( N) gave
the Ugenerally expected" response (M's responses in Film A);
in group Ne at all six choice points, the M gave ftunexpected
responsestr (M's responses in Film B); and in group CNC at

three alternate choice points, M gave expected responses
and at three alternate choice points, M 9ave u.n expected

responses (M's responses in Film C).

The three groups were

then split equally on performance and learning measures
(no-incentive and incentive phases), one half

ox

each

group responding under incentive conditions and then under
no-incentive conditions; the other half of each group

PORTER LIBRARY

21

responses to questions about what M would do at the six
choice points) were as follows:
4e 2 5; and group

eNe,

group C, 4.35; group Ne,

4.35; this small amount of di£ference

seems to indicate that the groups were relatively equal in
expectation.

Keeping in mind that determination of experi-

mental grouping was by the showing of a second (experimental
film A, B, or C) and that comirmation of expectancy occurred
when S's prediction happened in the film, the groups may be
described in terms of percent of mean expectancies confirmed
or disconfirmed:

group

CiS

expectations were 72% confirmed,

28% disconfirmed; group Ne's expectations were nearly
confirmed, nearly

1~

~

disconfiraed; and group CNe's expecta-

tions were 36% confiraed, 641 discanfirmed • . Thus, while the
groups were substantially equal in what they expected M to do,
one group was more than two-thirds confirmed in its expec-

tations, one group was more than one-third confirmed, and one
group was not confirmed o
Apparatus
Ss at one school were exposed to a viewing room devoid
of furnishings except for a projector and two chairs, and a
trial room with a one-way mirror.

In the room was a table

with those objects viewed in the film.

Conditions at the

second school prohibited use of one-way mirrors.

At this
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school S played on the lighted side

ox

the room at a table

with a table-length mirror such as used by speech therapists
and the two observers (Os) watched S through colored plastic
windows from inside a tent on the da.rkened s.ide of the room
15 feet away from the S.

Only one S actually walked out of

the enclosure across the room, peered into the tent and asked
the Os what they were doing.

His responses were deleted.

The responses of two other Ss at this school . ,e re not used

because of a procedural change:

these 55 (the rirst at this

school) were inside the tent with the Os outside looking in.
55 refused to respond £reely in the no-incentive phase, so

the procedure was changed to that described above.
In each :film described below, M enters a. room containing

a table.

On the table are the following:

a teddy bear,

about two-und-one-half feet long; a life-size milk bottle;
toy construction hat; wooden mallet and a child's toy pounding board with pegs.

Also on the table in the trial room but

not in the :film were a toy car, ner£' ball (four inch diameter
roam ball), a rin9 stackum, and a toy telephone.

are 16 mm, black and white, no sound, and
lengtho

2~3

The films

minutes in

The :films were cued so that E could consistently

stop at the same point to question S.

M in all films was an

adult male in his middle twenties dressed in a suit jacket and
tie.
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In the film descriptions below, the numerals in parentheses indicate the choice points at which E asked S ror
his prediction of M's behavior (SIS expectation).

!!.!..!.

A

(Training film).

M picks up the bear in both

arms and looks at it (1), then hugs it lovingly.

Still

holding the bear, he then picks up the milk bottle, posing it
as i£ he may pretend to feed the bear (2), then he does place
the bottle to the bear's mouth and rocks him while reeding.
After a few seconds of this, M pla.ces the bear on his
shoulder and raises his hand

as if' to burp the bear (3).

pats the bear's back to burp him.

M

M next picks up the wooden

mallet and places i t in the bear I s hand as if the bear were
going to strike the pegs in the pounding board (4)0

M guides

bear's hand as it pounds the pegs in the pounding board (4-5
times).

Putting the mallet down and holding the bear in one

arm, M now picks up the toy constxuction hat and looks at it
and then at the bear and then back to the hat, raising it up

as if he might put i t on the bear's head (5).

He places the

hat on the bear's head and smiles approvingly.

M now makes

the bear seem to knock the bat of£ its own head.

M scolds the

bear, pointin9 his finger and shaking his head in disapprovalo
M then turns the bear on its belly and raises his hand as i£
to spank the bear (6).

He then swats the bear's bottom three
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times and then scolds it some
Film Ba

more~

Films B and C dif£er from Film A only in the

response M gives at the six choice points, so only these
differences will be

described~

For Film B, at choice point (1), M hits the bear once,
twice to the table and then picks i t up and shakes it.

At

(2) he drinks from the bottle himself instead of feeding the
bear.

At (3) he throws the bear over his shoulder instead of

burping it.

At (4) he takes the mallet in his own hand and

hits the bear on the head three times.

At (5) he puts his

hand in the hat and raises it high above his head.

At (6),

hand raised to spank the bear, he scratches his head letting
the bear drop to the floor.
~

Film A.

£0

At choice point (1) M hugs the bear as in

At (2) he drinks the milk hiasel£ as in Film B.

(3) he burps the bear as in Film Ao
with the mallet as in Film B.
bear's head as in Film Ao

At

At (4) he hits the bear

At (5) he puts hat on the

At (6) he scratches his head as in

Film B.

Procedure
No-incentive, incentive seguence.

S was led to the

viewing room where a 16 mm projector was already set up with
the training film (Film A) ready to be shown.

S was told by E:
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nWe're going to watch a film about a man and a teddy bear.
It' $ called

f

Mike and the Bear. t

was shown wi thout comment by E.

Are you ready?'1

The £i 1m

E rewound the f'ilm and loaded

the appropriate experimental film for showing (Film A for
group C, Film B for group Ne, and Film C for group CNC).

E:

flNow we will watch the film again, only this time I will stop
the :film and ask you some questions about what yon think is
going to happen next.

you ready?"
S:

Be ready to answer when I stop.

Are

At the cued points, E stopped the f'ilm and asked

UWhat do you think the man will do next,11 or "What will

he do with the bear (or mallet, or hat)?U and recorded S's
answer without comment.

Af'ter the film has been shown, E

asked S to wait in a room with a one-way mirror (or at the
table with the long mirror for the second school), the room

already having in it the objects seen in the film and the
other toys not associated with M's responses.

"Please wai t

here for a few minutes until I come back to get you.
to get you some more toys to play with.
anything you want. tJ

I'm going

You may play wi th

As E closed the door, or le:ft the room,

E began timing the no-incentive phase (S minutes) while the
two Os recorded all

ox

SIS

responses on the check :form in

terms of predetermined responses categories (See Appendix B).
After the trial period, E reentered the trial room and said,

"Now,

(calls by name), do you remember what Mike did

26

in the film?

I want you to try to do as many things as you

can that you saw Mike do in the film.

For everything that

you do that Mike did I'll give you a sticker picture, like
this.

And if you get the pictures all in a little circle,

I'll give you a toy animal (or toy baseball player) to keep.
Okay t show me what Mike did. II

S was given a sticker picture

immediately following each response that matched M in either

film viewed--responses that corresponded to the choice points,
such as feeding the bear with the milk bottle.

Verbal rein-

forcement ("Right" or f1Good 1 . ) was given for matching component

responses, su.ch as picking up the milk bottle.

If S stopped

after performing a response and receiving reward, E said,

tfShow me something else Mike did, ff and so on until S volun-

teered he could remember no more.

The procedure for the incentive t no"incentive sequence
was the reverse of no-incentive, incentive sequence.
Response measure.

The response measure for both the

incentive and no-incentive phases was the type and frequency

or

responses matching the model in Film A (training film)o

The observers recorded all of SiS responses on the Check Form

ror E Observer (Appendix B).

Since they had not seen the

fi Ims and did not know the purpose of the experiment t the Os

could not know which responses were matching responses.

Four
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untrained female observers recorded responses:

two scored

the same children in anyone session, the other two taking
the next session.

The four scored £ive children independently

in one session for an estimate of interscorer reliability and
on the major choice point responses (the number of different
imitative responses produced) agreed 80%.

Chapter III
Results
Table 2 summarizes the analysis or variance of matching
responses to the training film under incentive and expectancy
conditions".

The training or first film in the

sequence was viewed by all 5s.

two~f'ilm

The findings show that the

expectancy condition (Film A, B, or C) had no erfect on
matching model r e sponses in the training fil m, either under
incentive or no-incentive conditions (p
and incentive did not interact (p)

> .10).

~05).

Expectancy

The incentive

condition had a signi£icant effect on the number of matching
responses produced (p <.05).

The Summary Table (Table 3)

Ior the training film shows this effect to be in the expected

positivQ direction, that is, that more responses were produced under incentive than under

no~incentive

conditions.

Table 3 shows that group C and eNC provided the differences
between incentive and no.-incentive conditions, while for
group NC the effect of incentive was in a slightly negative
direction, that is, group NC was the only group in which more
responses were produced under no.incentiva than under
tive conditions ..
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incen~

30

Since for half the S5 the incentive phase of incentivel
no~incentive

was first, and for half the incentive phase was

second, the e££ects of varying the sequence should be shown.
Table 4 is a summary table of incentive order.

It may be

noted that when incentive was second, there were more
matching responses (262) than when incentive was .first (249),
following the expected increase in a nO,- incentive, incentive
sequence (226 to 262) similar to Bandu r a (1965a).

However,

when incentive was first, that is, in the incentive, noincentive sequence, there was a decrease in matching responses
(249 to 181), the absolute difference in this sequence between

incentive and

no~incentive

being more than twice the difference

in the Bandurian sequence (no-incentive, incentive)o-

Overall,

those who had incentive first started at a higber plane and
tailed o££ in the mo-incentive phase, while those who had the
no~incentive

phase first started at a correspondingly lower

plane and increased slightly in the incentive phase,

indi~

eating that a major reason ror the signiricance of incentive

as shown by the analysis of variance may be the suppression

OI response on a no-incentive phase immediately following an
incentive phase (See Figure 1).
Whereas Table 2 sUJBII.arizes an analysis of variance of

matching responses to the training xilm, Table 5 summarizes
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overlapping of responses between films (See Appendix B).

The

three films do differ in major response categories (Table 6),
such as £eeding the bear milk (Film A) v. drinking from the
bottle himseli (Film B), but are similar in the v.arious
component responses, such as picking up the bear and the milk
bottle (both Films A and B).

It is not practical to divide

the single response measure into categories of those
matching the first film and those matching the second film
since there is no clear differentiat.ion, even in groups NC
and eNC.

Therefore, for purposes of interpreting data,

responses matching the training film (Table

~will

be used.

TABLE 5

Analysis of Variance:

Matching Responses to

Experimental Film (Second

Source

d:f

Fi~)

F

MS

I
I

Between Ss

S9

Expectancy (A)
Ss within groups
Within Ss

2

95.025

57

12.232

7.769**

60
,

Incentive (B)
A

1

XB

2

B X 5s wi thin groups

*p

< .05

**P

<.01

57

,-

45.633

4.138 *

20.909

1.896

11.027

1.896

Chapter IV
Discussion
Since there were no significant dif'ferences due to the
expectancy treatment, all
must be rejected.

or

the six proposed hypotheses

One cannot even accept hypothesis (a),

which states that nit' there are differences between groups,
incentive conditions will erase such di:fferences, indicating
that expectation is not a functional part of' the learning
process in modeling," since this hypothesis is prefaced on
group differences.

The results indirectly support the last

part of the hypothesis, and hence, Bandura's stimulus

contiguity theory.

That is, the learning

or

the model's

responses in the zirst fila did not depend on confirmation or
disconfirmation of expectancy through a second film.

Bandura

might argue that a certain amount of learning took place
during the training (:first) £ilm so that the expectancy
condi tion (second film) would not have an effect so much on

observational learning as on subsequent performance Q
However, whether expectation has to do wi th learning
or performance depends on the learning/perf"ormance
tion used.

distinc~

Each experimenter may operationalize his own
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distinction.

For example, Bandura (196Sa) has assumed a

relatively accurate index

ox

learning to be perIormance under

positive incentive conditions.

Assumdng response measures are

accurate, application o:f Baadura's index to this study shows
that group NC (Table 3) per:formed :fewer responses under the
incentive than under the no-incentive condition and thus
apparently did not learn.

This is of course preposterous and

only reminds us that in the measure

or

learning under

incentive (as opposed to the measure of per£ormance under
no-incentive), much can have intervened between the initial
observational learning and the learning per:formance, for
instance, other observational learning.
It is obvious that zuture research attempting to relate
expectancy to imitative learning must insure that the
expectancy condition and the observational learning condition
occur in the same situation, that is, simultaneously (assuming
these

~

separate constructs).

Besides the lack of contemporaneity

ox

the expectancy

variable and observational learning during the xirst film,
another criticism that may account for the lack of effect of
the expectancy condition is that expectancy apparently was
not a Uf'elt" condition, was not strongly held.

For instance,

it seems unlikely that a subject in the NC group experienced
dissonance at a motivating level, though there is perhaps
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slight indication

or

inhibition of responses under incentive

condi tions when compared with groups C and CNC.

Or it might

be that Ss in group NC felt punished by the expeximental
treatment (Film B) and in an ef:fort to "make up" with the
adult authority (E), responded more during the uncertainty
o:f the

no~incentive

phase, so that when the incentive phase

came second (and more certainty or security), fewer responses
resulted.
As defined by the use

ox

a second film in which what S

expected at six choice points was confirmed (group C),
disconfirmed (group He), or alternately confirmed and discon ..
firmed (group eNC) , expectancy was largely perceptual instead
of ":felt."

It was thought that defining expectancy this way

would give more weight to findings in regard to adding to or
revising Bandura' s stim111us/contigui ty theory, which states
that perceptual and symbolic responses acquired during
observational learning cue or elicit overt responses which
match those modeled.
Thus, besides measuring expectancy during the initial
observational process, a second recommendation :for :future
research would be to define the expectancy condition such
that the subject :feels strong dissonance at its disconfirmation.

It may be that the extent to which expectancy is
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important during modeling is a function of the consequences
that accrue around its confirmation or discon£irmation.
Contrast disconfirmation of expectancy in this experiment and
its effect on imitative behavior with other possible, more
motivatianally-tinted disconfirmations.

For instance,

consider a subject who sees a model do things in a film,

predicts on this basis, finds all predictions were wrong, and
then is asked to imitate the model; contrast this with a

subject who is promised $20.00 to view a model in a film,
told he cannot be paid after all, and then is asked to imitate
the model.

The question becomes:

Does expectancy playa

part in learning or mot:ivation (incentive)?

Or, are the two

recommendations (i.e., to measure expectancy during observational learning and to make expectancy a "felt H condition)
compatible?
Related to the validity or the expectancy condition are

the believability of the film as related to
the length

ox

time between rilms.

age

level and

The mean age of children

in this study was 70 months as compared to the mean age of
51 months in Bandura's model-consequences study (1965a).

The amount of imitativeness at various age levels was not

ox

interest in this experiment and it was assumed that the films
are believable (imitative) :for this age group (4 to 6 years).
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The expectancy treatment (second film) immediately followed
the training film.

A longer time interval between films

might have been conducive to greater matching of responses

modeled in the second fil m but would also have removed the
con£irmation or disconfirmation of expectancy even farther
from the observational process.
It was noted in the Results section in reporting analysis
of variance of matching responses to the second film that
group C might be expected to produce more matching responses
due to practice effects since those S5 saw the same film
twice.

However, in the Summary Table of matching responses

to the first fiLm (Table 3), this difference is not evident:
group eNC without practice performed more matching responses
under incentive conditions and group NC more under no-incentive conditions, though neither were significantly different.
This seems to indicate that practice did not have a significant effect, but rather that the reasons for the contrived
differences in matching responses on the second film (Table
5) are lack of differentiation between f'irst and second film
responses, especially between the various component responses,
and that 5s simply matched those responses in the training
(first) film and not in the experimental (second) film.
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This study seemed to have more relevance ror incentive
condition (incentive v. no-incentive) and possibly incentive
order (first v. second) than for expectancy.

Incentive order

merits inclusion in further i ncentive v. no-incentive treatments of imitation, especially as incentive purports to
di£fereatiate learning and performance.

As indicated in the

Results section, the main reason ror the signiricance of the
incentive condition in this study was not so much the
increase of responses arter a no-incentive phase but the
decrease of responses after an incentive phase.

The use of

an incentive, no-incentive sequence and its consequent
suppression of response in the second phase does not invalidate the Bandurian no-incentive, incentive sequence, but one
wonders whether or not a reversed incentive sequ,e nce in
Bandura's model--consequences experiment (1965a) would have
"wiped out n reward/punishment differences.

seems to involve a different kind of
of reward.

Incentive order

expectancy~-expectancy

There is little likelihood S would expect reward

in a no-incentive following an incentive phase because in
this procedure E, the giver of reward, was absent in the noincentive phase.

Except :for group NC, this incentive,

no-incentive sequence seems to point to a common sUbject Attitude of HI've pleased E, got my rewards, now I can do what I

want."
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There are several procedural questions.
training film necessary?

(a)

Was the

Since its purpose was to provide

a common background for the 5s, to build relatively same
expectancies, the training film could also have included the
confirmation or disconrirmation
were carefully made.

or

the second film, if it

This would have the advantage of

measuring expectancy during the initial observational process.
(b) Did the "cbaracter ll of the films have a special effect?
One doubts that receipt o:f reward was the only reason for
incentive, no-incentive differences, since group NC showed very
small differences while groups C and CNC were responsible for
the significant difference (p

< .05).

The expectancy

condition for NC (total disconfirmation) did not interact with
incentive, so one speculates as to what did.
the character of the films:

group

CIS

It was perhaps

film (A) shows M as

loving and helpful; group Nels film (B) shows M as selfish
and hostile; and group
and hostile o

CNe's film (C) shows M as both loving

The character of the films may have affected

certain attentional aspects of observational learning or
elicited emotional responses which could affect performance.
Epstein (1962) has theorized that the use of an aggressive M

in film may result in S identifying with the aggressor as a
defense mechanism to avoid anxiety.

(c) One wonders about
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the use o£ a film projector with its stoppages (at the choice
points to ask S his expectation) as opposed to the rather
incidental viewing of a television screen in Bandura's experiment (l965a).

Are such stoppages and question-asking

facilitative or inhibitory to the process of expectancy?
(d) Do several disconfirmed expectancies have a building effect
similar to the Asch conformity situation (1952)?

Unlike the

conformer in the Asch experiment, the conformer distraught at
having expectation discon£irmed has no majority opinion in
which to take refuge (only the opposites of what he expects).
(e) Is expectancy as a cognitive process to be measured in

terms of total or general responses. such as associated with
each choice point (See Table 6), or numerous component responSince E rewarded 5 with sticker pictures only for the

ses?

major responses, was the number of responses in the incentive
trials artiricially restricted, that is, not equally likely to
occur as those in the no.incentive phase?
nature

or

Because of the

giving reward and because of individual differences,

the incentive phase tended to be less than the

5~minute

no-incentive phase length o
Determining the effect of confirmation and disconfirmation of expectancy during the observational process of
imitative learning may only be, like so many measurement
problems in psychology, a procedural problem.

Chapter V

Summary
The purpose

or

this study was to determine the e££ects

of confirmation and disconfirmation

or

expectancy during

modeling behavior, or imitative learning.

Very little research

has been done relating the learning concept of modeling to
the cognitive concept of

expectancy~

so several hypotheses

were made based on rinding differences between the three
groups, defined by conditions o£ expectancy confirmation:

group C, l()()% cOnIirmed; group CNC, 50)5 conf'irmed; and group
NC,

~

confirmed.

All Ss (60 primary school children) were

exposed to a training film in which an adult male performed
a novel repertoire

or

responses, to an experimental

which confirmed or disconfirmed

SiS

fi~

verbal expectancies and

then were observed under inoentive and

no~incentive

conditions.

Analysis of variance of the response measure (S's
responses matching

MiS

responses in the training film) shQwed

that the expectancy treatment was not signiricant, but the

incentive treatment was signif'icant at the .01 level Q
Results were interpreted to mean that the siDple, perceptual derinition of confirmation of expectancy--S seeing
what be had said M would do next in the £ilm--was not found
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to be important for its effect on modeling behavior.

It was

thus hypothesized that expectancy as a ".tel ttl motivational
condition (e.g., expectancy has an emotional effect, such as
expecting $20.00 and not getting it) and measured during
actual observational learning, that is, during the training
film, would have a greater exxect on learning M's responses
than merely expecting something to occur in a film.
The signixicance of the incentive treatment was in the
expected positive direction, that, more matching responses
were performed under incentive than under no-in centive.
Incentive order (Incentive,

No~incentive Vo

No-incentive,

Incentive) may be an important design £law in other published
experiments in which the primary differentiation between
performance and learning is positive incentive conditions.

Appendix

Appendix A
SUBJECT ANSWER FORM FOR USE BY EXPERIMENTER

Subject_________________
Group___________________

Film

--------------------

Choice Point
1.

Responses
_

bugs bear
hits bear

feeds bear milk
drinks from bottle himself

burps bear

_

throws bear over shoulder

-- nits pegs

in pounding board

hits bear with mallet
-------~-----

s.

puts hat on bear's head

-

-- puts hat on own head
____ holds hat on hand up high

spanks the bear

scratches his head
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Subject

Group____

BEAR

10

_

picks up bear

_

hugs bear

2.

10

Observer Name

CHECK FORM FOR E CBSERVER

MIIK BOTTLE

2:.

--picks up milk bottle
reeds bear with bottle
drinks £rom bottle
himself

--pu.ts bear on
shoulder

1.

-p'a t s bear's back_

CAR

2.

--picks up mallet

--picks up hat

~uts mallet in
----Oear's paw and

_ puts hat on
--oear's head

--pounds peg himself

........,puts hat on

__hi~s bear's head__
W1 th mallet

--puts hat on _
hand and raises

own head

--pushes car around

~

a>

--(shakes finger - and head at bear)
-

-

turns bear on

makes bear

belly

hat off its
own head

--picks up car
1. RING STACKING

crashes car into
another toy

--

drops bear-

1.
-

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

NERF BALL

2.

throws ball up and

\lS

RANDOM

2.

--playing w/toys

catches

rolls ball on table

1.

_ _walks around

not playing w/toYS-

.....
OTHER

~------

1.

-----~---

--.

2.

~

~

peg

stands around not

~

~

><

takes rings of£

1. TELEPHONE
2•
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --pretends to call

scratches own

~ead,

2.

__stacks rings up

lets bear push car

spanks bear's
bottom

up high

-seem to knock--

(burps bear)

scolds bear

2.

10

pounds peg

hits bear

HAT

I.PEGBOARD/MALLET 2.

---------...-.~--

--_ ..... ---_ .... _-- --------------

--pretends to
let bear talk--
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